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The topic of advocacy by scientists has been debated for decades, yet there is
little agreement about whether scientists can or should be advocates. The fear
of crossing a line into advocacy continues to hold many scientists back from
contributing to public discourse, impoverishing public debate about important
issues. We believe that progress in this debate is limited by a misconception
about the relationship between scientific integrity and objectivity. We begin
by unpacking this relationship and debunking three common misconceptions
about advocacy by scientists: namely, that advocacy is harmful to scientific
credibility, beyond the scope of science, and incompatible with science, which
is value-free. We propose new ways of thinking about responsible advocacy by
conservation scientists, drawing on practices from the health sciences, where
researchers and professional bodies are empowered to act as health advocates.
In so doing, we hope to open further space for conservation scientists to ac-
tively and legitimately engage in public debate about conservation issues.
Introduction
Conservation is a matter of public interest but public
debate about conservation is dominated by vested in-
terest groups—business and industry on the one hand,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and lobby
groups on the other. Conservation scientists often self-
select out, fearful of transgressing from scientific com-
munication to advocacy, and thereby tarnishing their
scientific credibility. This is not the case for scientists who
work in other areas of public interest. In health care, for
example, medical researchers are muchmore likely to en-
gage in public debate, empowered by the recognition of
advocacy as core disciplinary skill (Chapman, 2001). We
believe the reasons conservation scientists choose not to
engage are in large part based on misconceptions about
the relationship between scientific integrity and objec-
tivity. We unpack this relationship, debunk common
misconceptions, and offer new ways of thinking about
responsible advocacy that we hope will free conservation
scientists to more actively engage in public debate.
Debates about advocacy by scientists inevitably make
distinctions between advocacy and knowledge brokerage
or scientific communication. This distinction is commonly
made on the basis of objectivity; brokerage is portrayed
as honest and neutral (Pielke Jr 2007), whereas advocacy
is painted as value-based and deceptive (Gitzen 2007).
We argue that these dichotomous categories rely on
an oversimplified concept of scientific objectivity and
emphasize only extreme actions, ignoring what is in
fact a wide spectrum of valid and valuable modes of
public engagement (see Lach et al. 2003, for example).
A similar distinction between evaluating and stipulating
policy has also been suggested (Scott & Rachlow 2011).
We believe this distinction, like that between brokerage
and advocacy, rests on the same problematic definition
of objectivity. Although we agree with the proposal—
central to both Pielke Jr (2007) and Scott & Rachlow
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(2011)—that widening, rather than narrowing the scope
of policy options is important work for scientists, we
argue that this is not incompatible with expressing an
explicit, transparent position about particular policies.
There are many ways in which scientists can engage in
policy, including working directly with decision-makers,
community education, media communication, and
giving testimony at public hearings. Advocacy—defined
here as support for, or objection to, a particular position,
proposal, policy, or decision—is a part of that mix
of engagement activities. It goes beyond what would
traditionally be considered brokerage to the extent that
it removes the burden on scientific facts to speak for
themselves, but it should not be taboo for scientists
because it can be done with integrity, in a responsible,
transparent, evidence-based way.
We believe the fear of crossing an illusory line into ad-
vocacy holds many scientists back from contributing to
public discourse. In the face of an extinction crisis, the
standard of debate about conservation is impoverished
when scientists with relevant knowledge remain silent
outside the pages of their academic journals. Our goal is
to remove existing obstacles by debunking common ob-
jections to advocacy by scientists, and to help create le-
gitimate space for scientists in public debate beyond the
brokerage-advocacy dichotomy.
Common objections to advocacy
Common arguments against advocacy by scientists are
(1) advocacy damages one’s scientific credibility, (2) ad-
vocacy is beyond the scope of science, and (3) scientists
should strive to be value-free. Existing guidelines for sci-
entists who wish to advocate do little to alleviate scien-
tists’ fears. In fact, they may exacerbate anxiety by setting
impossible standards and perpetuating false dichotomies
(e.g., advocacy is about values; science is not).
Objection 1: Advocacy damages your scientific
credibility
Despite this oft-made claim, there is little evidence that
engaging in advocacy damages scientific credibility in
the academic sphere (Blockstein 2002). Conservation in-
cludes many examples of eminent scientist-advocates
such as E.O. Wilson, Jane Goodall, and Jane Lubchenco.
The main risk to scientific credibility comes from poorly
substantiated advocacy (Lach et al. 2003). Indeed, when
surveyed, conservation biologists supported transparent,
evidence-based policy advocacy in scientific papers (Scott
et al. 2007). In a recent survey of scientists, 87% believed
that scientists should “take an active role in public pol-
icy debates about science and technology” (Pew Research
Centre 2015: p. 7).
Advocacy is also unlikely to damage a scientist’s rep-
utation in the public sphere, where effective communi-
cation, familiarity, and trust—not perceived objectivity—
are most important for building and maintaining credibil-
ity (Scott et al. 2007; Schaefer & Beier 2013).
In some cases, advocacy might bring career benefits.
Academic position descriptions increasingly request de-
tails of outreach and extension work, including com-
munity education and media communication. Similarly,
many funding schemes now ask for demonstrated impact
beyond academic publication.
The consequences of speaking out will differ for differ-
ent scientists (e.g., NGO and academic scientists may be
more free to advocate than government scientists). But
advocacy might also benefit scientists outside academia
and NGOs. For example, U.S. presidents have tradi-
tionally chosen outspoken scientists as senior advisors
(Schaefer & Beier 2013).
Objection 2: Advocacy is outside the scope
of science
Another common objection is that it is the role of NGOs
to advocate for conservation. There are two problems
with this. First, NGOs are less focused on conservation
issues than they have been in the past, with the environ-
mental space effectively filled by climate change concerns
(Novacek 2008). Second, despite some notable excep-
tions, when NGOs address conservation issues, they tend
to target charismatic species, rather than a scientifically
defensible set of priorities.
Even if these two conditions were to change, it would
not necessarily constitute a good argument for keeping
scientists out of public debate. Indeed, many argue that
there is an ethical imperative for conservation scientists
to speak out on issues related to their research, especially
given that past conservation success is directly linked
to advocacy by scientists (Noss 2007; Schaefer & Beier
2013).
Objection 3: Scientists should strive to be
value-free; advocacy is incompatible with this
This objection really gets to the heart of the matter (the
two above rest on its shoulders). Values in science are of-
ten viewed with suspicion, seen as undermining objectiv-
ity and delegitimizing scientific authority (Douglas 2007).
This is true in certain situations; for instance, if medical
research is influenced by pharmaceutical company pres-
sure. But values have a role and place in science. Val-
ues relating to knowledge acquisition (epistemic values),
such as accuracy, honesty, and testability, underpin the
development of scientific theory and methods, whereas
ethical values such as regard for human and animal
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welfare shape research agendas and govern scientific
practice.
Other (nonepistemic) values underlie scientific judg-
ments too. For instance, when the consequences of mak-
ing an error are high, the standard of evidence required
to draw a conclusion is generally set higher. Here, there is
an unavoidable trade-off to be made between two types
of errors: false positives (detecting an effect that is not
there) and false negatives (failing to detect an effect that
is there). The trade-off between these two error rates is
a value judgment—it depends on personal beliefs about
the costs of each error. Two scientists may draw different
conclusions, depending on the standard of evidence they
choose.
Every statistical method involves some kind of trade-
off—if not between false positives and false negatives,
then perhaps between parsimony and fit. Even conven-
tional thresholds, such as P < 0.05 or AIC > 2, do not
avoid value judgments; they carry with them pre-made
trade-offs about what’s important and how important
it is.
Some value judgments (e.g., what is a tolerable level
of extinction risk?) can and should be disentangled from
judgments that are more factual in nature (e.g., the prob-
ability of extinction). But even judgments deemed “more
factual” are not necessarily value-free, and no amount of
self-checking or personal reflection can make them so.
Individual scientists may be biased by their values and
backgrounds but fortunately, the limits of “personal ob-
jectivity” can be counterbalanced by a diverse scientific
community that fosters a collective objectivity (Longino
1990). Diversity ensures a single value system does not
dominate and allows exploration of areas outside the
prevailing paradigm. For example, before the 1970s, the
prevailing view among primatologists was that males
dominated primate social structures. When female prima-
tologists entered the field, their different research focus
and methods led to more research on female primates,
and uncovered new evidence that overturned previously
held beliefs about dominance hierarchies (see Haraway
1989). Together, different perspectives painted a more ac-
curate picture of a complex phenomenon. It is the collec-
tive that maintains objectivity, not the individual. This
should come as a relief to most scientists—it is not sim-
ply the quality of your own self-reflection that defends
scientific knowledge!
Advocating responsibly, not inadvertently
Advice for responsible advocacy by scientists inevitably
includes an instruction to separate science from values
(Goodwin 2012; Schaefer & Beier 2013). It is this self-
checking step that is seen as the one that makes the
subsequent activity “responsible.” If we accept that this
is often impossible and indeed, self-deceiving, then we
need a new way of thinking about what we consider re-
sponsible action and approaches for avoiding inadvertent
advocacy.
Inadvertent advocacy occurs when a scientist presents
personal preference as scientific judgment (Wilhere
2012). Sometimes this occurs by accident, when a sci-
entist fails to recognize that there are values embedded
in their methodological choices or interpretations; other
times, it involves a deliberate dressing up of values as facts
(“advocacy by stealth”: Pielke Jr 2007).
At an individual level, scientists can avoid inadvertent
advocacy by being more transparent in scientific practice.
As a discipline, conservation science can develop a sys-
tematic and coordinated approach to research translation
and implementation. Both suggestions rest on explicit ac-
knowledgement that values are present in every step of
scientific practice. We do not mean to imply that this is
trivial: it is a cultural shift. However, there are prece-
dents for these practices in other disciplines, which we
discuss below.
Transparency through disclosure
Qualitative researchers have established guidelines for
the disclosure of relevant personal values and beliefs. In
the social sciences, this involves revealing one’s relation-
ship to the participants being studied, including poten-
tially hidden power relationships that may affect data
collection and/or final results. It also includes disclosing
prior beliefs. For example, a public health researcher in-
terviewing teenagers about recreational drug use might
disclose their personal experience with drug use, and
their prior beliefs about the phenomenon; e.g., that me-
dia coverage has exaggerated the prevalence of drugs in
the community. Because one’s personal history and prior
beliefs may influence the questions asked and the an-
swers received (e.g., whether the teenagers speak to the
interviewer honestly), they are important to any reader’s
interpretation of the research. This kind of openness may
have the added benefit of increasing public faith in sci-
ence (Pittinsky 2015).
Disclosure of one’s (relevant) personal history is com-
plicated in the context of multi-authored papers in ecol-
ogy and may not be necessary to the same extent. But
some degree of personal reflection will help avoid the ad-
vocacy by stealth discussed by Pielke and others (Pielke Jr
2007; Wilhere 2012). As a starting point, ecologists may
ask:
(1) What is the research culture in my lab (e.g., dom-
inant methodologies and analysis techniques) and
how has this affected me?
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(2) Who is funding my research, and how has their
value system influenced me?
(3) What are my own personal values (e.g., I value grass-
lands) and prior beliefs (e.g., grasslands are threat-
ened) and how do they influence my methodological
choices and interpretations?
Research translation and implementation
In the early 1990s, the Cochrane Collaboration was
formed with the intention of producing systematic
reviews to aid evidence-based decision-making and
policy in medicine (Chalmers 1993). This formal
synthesis of existing evidence was an attempt to bridge
the research-practice divide. Although an important step,
it was not enough. The facts—even when systematically
accumulated—do not speak for themselves. Failures to
translate research into practice and policy exposed pa-
tients to unnecessary risks and sometimes harm caused
by their medical treatment (Grimshaw et al. 2012).
New disciplines of research translation and implemen-
tation science nowwork to rectify this in medicine, by en-
suring research does impact policy and practice. In other
words, researchers are providing an evidence-base for ef-
fective advocacy. These activities are not considered “out-
side the scope of science” or “exaggerated activism”; they
are a legitimate scientific extension of medical research.
The role of professional bodies in advocacy
Professional bodies may play an important role here.
They can model responsible advocacy, or provide for-
mal support for scientists and institutions, who—in
certain political climates—may fear repercussions from
advocating.
There are strong precedents for professional bodies
acting as advocates. The American Medical Association
has long advocated for public health policies, including
campaigns for the introduction of seatbelts and support
for anti-smoking policies (see http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/about-ama/our-history/ama-history-timeline.
page?). The American Psychological Association has
been similarly active, advocating for policies about the
mental health needs of children, older adults, and people
of color (see http://www.apa.org/about/gr/advocacy/
index.aspx).
Recently, the Ecological Society of Australia established
Hot Topics, an online resource that synthesizes scientific
research relevant to environmental policy development
(see http://www.ecolsoc.org.au/groups/hot-topics). This




We don’t suggest that ‘anything goes’ when it comes
to advocacy. Nor that speaking out will be easy or
problem-free. Gray areas abound. However, we believe
that advocacy by scientists can broaden and deepen
public discourse about conservation issues. We borrow
from precedents in other disciplines to present a model
of responsible advocacy by scientists. First, encouraging
scientists to disclose their personal values and improving
incentives for transparency within conservation science
may help break down some of the artificial dichotomies
that separate science and advocacy. Second, acknowl-
edging the importance of knowledge translation and
developing a coordinated, systematic approach to science
implementation could help guide responsible advocacy
by scientists. Finally, professional societies could provide
valuable institutional support for scientist-advocates.
An important goal of our paper was to disassociate ad-
vocacy from ‘extremism’ and reclaim space for scientists
to engage in informed public debate in a way that does
not deny their value-systems. We approached this by de-
constructing three common arguments against advocacy
by scientists, which rest heavily on false distinctions be-
tween science and values. If you have been holding back
for any one of these reasons, we hope we have eased
your concerns and encouraged you to join the public
conversation.
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